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possess the powers of supervision would mean to be able to develop easier a laxist monetary policy; 
and this serves the interest of the politician. Otherwise, if the central banker is conservative, he 
would pay attention to his not accommodating reputation. In this case, he would like to strengthen  
such reputation, with the same behaviour, also when he carries out the supervision policy.  
The present paper intends to analyze theoretically this problem list13.            
The paper is structured as follows: after the introduction, in the second section we present the 
general model. In the third and fourth sections we examine the principal-and-two-agents model in 
the electoral and non-electoral periods.  In the fifth  and seventh sections the single-agent contract is 
analysed, in the electoral and non-electoral periods.  The sixth and eighth sections give a 
comparison between the two contracts. In the ninth section remarks and possible developments are 
discussed.  Finally, our conclusions. 
 
2. The general model   
This paper14 analyses the advantage to be gained in entrusting the tasks of “banking supervision” 
and “monetary policy” to two agents, Banking Authority (BA) and Central Bank (CB), or to a 
single agent, CB. In this analysis two periods are examined: electoral and non-electoral. The model 
is that of a principal with two agents, where the principal is the political group in power, while the 
agents are, as we have said, BA and CB. 
The politician has his own utility function U, which will take on four different values according to 
whether four different events take place. These events are: 
  Bs = stability in the banking system 
  Ps =  price stability 
–Bs = banking instability 
–Ps = price instability. 
The utility function U is defined thus: 
                                                 
13In the literature there are no theoretical models linking the problem of the choice of institutional setup of supervisory 
bodies, with the electoral cycle.     
14 The approach adopted is that proposed by Franck - Krausz (2004) 
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U = 
u1     if     E1 = Bs ∩ Ps 
u2     if     E2 = Bs ∩ -Ps  
u3     if     E3 = -Bs ∩ Ps  
u4     if     E4 = -Bs ∩ -Ps 
A stable banking system means lack of banking crises. The banking system stability is promoted by 
a tight regulation policy, while the banking system instability is pursued by a loose regulation 
policy. We suppose that a low frequency of banking crises is the consequence of a strict regulation. 
Unless the politician has a blanket preference for stability in the banking system rather than 
instability regardless of whether or not it is an election period, he will attain greater utility if there is 
price instability in the election period and stability in the non-election period. This situation, in fact, 
gives the politician more probability of pursuing his objective, i.e. being re-elected.  In the short 
term,  price instability and therefore an increase in inflation - as long as it is not perceived by wage-
earners - determines a reduction in real wages and a consequent drop in unemployment, and this 
may mean that the politician receives more support from electors, thus increasing his chance of 
being re-elected. In the long term, however, as Friedman asserts15, there is no trade off between 
inflation and unemployment.    
The “inflation surprise” effect is annulled in the long run, when wage-earners re-adjust their 
expectations in view of the inflation level actually chosen by the authorities. The preference for 
banking system stability is justified by the fact that a crisis in the system would lead to a loss of 
confidence among depositors, obviously not desirable for a politician whose immediate goal is to be 
re-elected.  Most of all, in the non-election period it will be to the politician’s advantage to have a 
stable banking system, because this makes it easier to achieve the objective of price stability. In 
fact, the presence of failed banks calls for the intervention of the central bank which, as lender of 
last resort, injects liquidity into the system to cope with the crisis, at the same time altering the 
equilibrium of the money market.  
                                                 
15 Friedman (1968) 
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In the election period it will therefore be 
u2 > u1; u4 > u3  (i.e. also u2 >u4 and u1>u3). 
As established by principal-agent models, the principal offers a contract to the agents giving them 
the incentive to act in the exclusive interests of the principal. This contract envisages a payment to 
be made to the agents, appropriate to the results they have attained. To be precise, BA will receive 
tb  if there is  –Bs, and Tb if there is Bs (obviously with tb < Tb), and CB will receive tp if there is Ps, 
and Tp if  there is –Ps (with tp < Tp ). 
To give t to the agent, the politician will spend u(t), that is, a higher sum than will actually be paid 
to the agent; this is also due to the transaction costs he has to sustain. 
The politician’s expected net utility will therefore be: 
(1) E(U-u) = [u1 - u(Tb) – u(tp)] Pr(Bs ∩ Ps) + [u2 – u(Tb) – u(Tp)] Pr(Bs ∩ -Ps) + 
                      + [u3 - u(tb) – u(tp)] Pr(-Bs ∩ Ps) + [u4 – u(tb) – u(Tp)] Pr(-Bs ∩ -Ps)  
To obtain a certain outcome each agent must make an “effort”. We will call eb the effort of BA and 
ep that of CB. Let us suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that both variables can assume only two 
values: eb = 0 or eb = 1 and similarly for ep. For this reason, the possible couples (eb, ep) are four.  
To simplify the writing, we put: 
(2)  
e00 = (eb = 0) ∩ (ep = 0)    - no effort made in either function - 
e01 = (eb = 0) ∩ (ep = 1)     - effort made only for price stability (restrictive monetary policy)-   
e10 = (eb = 1) ∩ (ep = 0)     -effort made only for banking stability – 
e11 = (eb = 1) ∩ (ep = 1)      -effort made in both functions – 
and  p00, p01, p10, p11 the corresponding probabilities. 
The probability of achieving a stable banking system is affected by the agents’ behavior in line with 
political decisions. We therefore introduce the following probabilities: 
  P0b = Pr(Bs | e01)  P1b = Pr(Bs | e10) 
  P2b = Pr(Bs | e11)  P3b = Pr(Bs | e00) 
Given the meaning of these probabilities, we expect that: 
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(2)’               P1b ≥ P2b ; P3b ≥ P0b
Under equal effort by the banking authorities, the probability of achieving a stable banking system 
is higher when monetary policy is expansionistic16.  
As for price stability, we insert the following probabilities: 
(3)  P0p = Pr(Ps | ep = 0 ∩ -Bs) P1p = Pr(Ps | ep = 1 ∩ Bs) 
  P2p = Pr(Ps | ep = 1 ∩ -Bs) P3p = Pr(Ps | ep = 0 ∩ Bs) 
The probability of achieving a stable price level depends of whether the monetary authority makes 
an effort, and on the degree of stability of the banking system, since this is the channel conveying 
monetary policy. In particular, there is a higher probability of stable prices when the banking 
system is stable17.  
We therefore expect : 
(3)’               P0p ≤ P2p; P3p ≤ P1p . 
The introduction of these conditional probabilities becomes necessary when we look at the agents’ 
utility. This is a problem of constrained maximization. The politician has his own utility function 
and to maximize it he has to minimize costs. He will therefore have to identify what size incentives 
can maximize his expected utility, within certain constraints determined by the contract with the 
agents. These are incentive and  participation constraints. 
If we want to express the probabilities present in (1), through the probabilities introduced with (3), 
keeping in mind the definition of conditional probability18 and the resulting properties, we obtain: 
(4) Pr(Bs ∩ Ps) = P3p [P3b p00 + P1b p10] + P1p [P0b p01 + P2b p11] 
(5) Pr(Bs ∩ -Ps) = (1- P3p) [P3b p00 + P1b p10] + (1 - P1p) [P0b p01 + P2b p11] 
(6) Pr(-Bs ∩ Ps) = P0p [(1 - P3b) p00 + (1 - P1b) p10] + P2p [(1 - P0b) p01 + (1 - P2b) p11] 
(7) Pr(-Bs ∩ -Ps) = (1 - P0p) [(1 - P3b) p00 + (1 - P1b) p10] + (1 – P2p) [(1 - P0b) p01 + (1 - P2b) p11] 
                                                 
16 An inflationistic monetary policy is not desirable if one considers the goal of price stability. This conflict of interests 
is one of the factors in support of giving the roles to different authorities.  
17 “Stability of the financial sector is important for monetary authorities, as monetary and financial sector stability are 
closely connected. History provides many examples where problems in the financial sector led to monetary instability. 
The Great Depression in the U.S. is probably the best known example where bank failures, combined with an 
inadequate response by the monetary authorities,  resulted in a prolonged economic crises…” (Eijffinger 2001)  
18  Pr (A|B) = Pr (A∩B)/ Pr (B) 
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We prove the first one (4): 
Pr(Bs ∩ Ps)  = Pr(Bs ∩ Ps ∩ (ep = 0 ∪ ep = 1)) = 
= Pr(Bs ∩ Ps ∩ ep = 0) + Pr(Bs ∩ Ps ∩ ep = 1) = 
= Pr(Ps | Bs ∩ ep = 0) Pr(Bs ∩ ep = 0) + Pr(Ps | Bs ∩ ep = 1) Pr(Bs ∩ ep = 1) = 
for (3)  
= P3p Pr(Bs ∩ ep = 0) + P1p Pr(Bs ∩ ep = 1) = 
= P3p [Pr(Bs ∩ (e00 ∪  e10))] + P1p [Pr(Bs ∩ (e01 ∪  e11))] = 
= P3p [Pr(Bs ∩ e00) + Pr(Bs ∩ e10)] + P1p [Pr(Bs ∩ e01) + Pr(Bs ∩ e11)]=                                   
= P3p [Pr(Bs | e00) Pr(e00) + Pr(Bs | e10) Pr(e10)] + P1p [Pr(Bs | e01) Pr(e01) + Pr(Bs | e11) Pr(e11)]= 
= P3p [P3b p00 + P1b p10] + P1p [P0b p01 + P2b p11]. 
These probabilities (4, 5, 6, 7) will assume different values according to the considered period: 
electoral or non electoral period. 
The politician is sure that given adequate incentives, the authorities will act in his interests. 
Consequently, in the election period, the monetary authority will recieve incentives to make no 
effort to maintain stable prices. As we have already seen, in fact, price instability is preferable for 
the politician in the electoral period, while he always wants a stable banking system. The politician 
therefore supposes that there will almost certainly be (eb = 1 ∩ ep = 0) = e10, and the probability of 
this eventuating will be p10 = 1. All the other pij probabilities will be null. This result will be not the 
same if we consider the non electoral period. Therefore, in the electoral period we can re-write the 
probabilities (4, 5, 6, 7), in this way: 
(4)’   Pr(Bs ∩ Ps | e10) = P1b P3p 
(5)’   Pr(Bs ∩ -Ps | e10) = P1b (1 – P3p) 
(6)’   Pr(-Bs ∩ Ps | e10) = (1 – P1b) P0p 
(7)’   Pr(-Bs ∩ -Ps | e10) = (1 – P1b) (1 – P0p) . 
On the other hand, in the non-electoral period, since the politician will prefer a stable banking 
system and price stability, he will give the agents adequate incentives to achieve this goal. To be 
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precise, he will offer BA tb if there is –Bs, and Tb if there is Bs (obviously with tb < Tb ), and he will 
give CB tp  if there is –Ps, and Tp if there is Ps (with  tp < Tp ). Following the same line of thinking 
as before,  the politician is convinced that both the authorities will make an effort to reach stability, 
one for prices, the other for the banking system. So for the politician there will be e11, and the 
corrresponding probability will be p11 = 1. All the other probabilities will be null. From (4)-(7) it 
therefore follows that: 
(4)’’   Pr(Bs ∩ Ps | e11) = P2b P1p 
(5)’’    Pr(Bs ∩ -Ps | e11) = P2b (1 – P1p) 
(6)’’    Pr(-Bs ∩ Ps | e11) = (1 – P2b) P2p 
(7)’’    Pr(-Bs ∩ -Ps | e11) = (1 – P2b) (1 – P2p).19
Consequently, the politician’s expected net utility will assume two different expressions, according 
to whether one considers the electoral period: 
(8)  E(U-u | e10) = [u1 - u(Tb) – u(tp)] P1b P3p + [u2 – u(Tb) – u(Tp)] P1b (1 – P3p) + 
+ [u3 - u(tb) – u(tp)] (1 – P1b) P0p + [u4 – u(tb) – u(Tp)] (1 – P1b) (1 – P0p) 
 or the non-electoral period: 
(9)   E(U-u | e11) = [u1 - u(Tb) – u(Tp)] P2b P1p + [u2 – u(Tb) – u(tp)] P2b (1 – P1p) +           
 + [u3 - u(tb) – u(Tp)](1 – P2b) P2p + [u4 – u(tb) – u(tp)] (1 – P2b) (1- P2p) 
                                                 
19 Since they will be useful later, let us complete the calculation of the other conditional probabilities, as follows: 
 
(4)’”   Pr(Bs ∩ Ps | e01) = P0b P1p 
 
(5)’”   Pr(Bs ∩ -Ps | e01) = P0b (1 - P1p)   
 
(6)’”   Pr(-Bs ∩ Ps | e01) = (1 - P0b) P2p
 
(7)’”   Pr(-Bs ∩ -Ps | e01) = (1 - P0b) (1 – P2p) 
 
 
(4)’”’   Pr(Bs ∩ Ps | e00) = P3b P3p  
 
(5)’”’   Pr(Bs ∩ -Ps | e00) = P3b (1 - P3p)   
 
(6)’”’   Pr(-Bs ∩ Ps | e00) = (1 - P3b) P0p
 
(7)’”’   Pr(-Bs ∩ -Ps | e00) = (1 – P3b) (1 – P0p).  
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where however, this time, u1 > u2 and u3 > u4,  i.e. the politician’s utility is higher with a restrictive 
monetary policy. To make the relations between the different values of ui clearer, let us say in the 
electoral period: 
u1 = G; u2 = G (1 + R); u3 = g; u4 = g (1 + r) 
G: measures the preferences for stability in the banking system; 
R: represents the higher value that the politician obtains if there is price instability at the same time 
as stability in the banking system; 
g: indicates the preferences for instability in the banking system; 
r: is the higher gains obtained by the politician if there is price instability, given the instability in the 
banking system; with G > g  and  r < R. 
Substituting these values in (8), we obtain:  
(8)’  E(U-u | e10) = [G - u(Tb) – u(tp)] P1b P3p + [G (1 + R) – u(Tb) – u(Tp)] P1b (1 – P3p) +  
                            + [g - u(tb) – u(tp)] (1 – P1b) P0p + [g (1 + r) – u(tb) – u(Tp)] (1 – P1b) (1 – P0p). 
In the non-electoral period  let us say: 
u1 = G (1 + R); u2 = G; u3 = g (1 + r); u4 = g  
and from (9) we obtain: 
(9)’  E(U-u | e11) = [G (1 + R) - u(Tb) – u(Tp)] P2b P1p + [G – u(Tb) – u(tp)] P2b (1 – P1p) +  
                            + [g (1 + r) - u(tb) – u(Tp)] (1 – P2b) P2p + [g – u(tb) – u(tp)] (1 – P2b) (1 – P2p) 
As for the choice of cost function u(t), we use the function  
(10)    u(t) =   t2/2  if   t  ≥ 0               
                 = - t2/2 if   t  < 0 
 Thus u’(t) = t  and u is increasing. 
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